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While the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution has lately been 
receiving much attention from the United States Supreme Court, another concept 
closely linked to takings - retroactivity - has been of even more interest to the 
Court recently. In 1994, the Court is expected to decide at least five important 
retroactivity cases, many of which will help better define the contours of the 
Takings Clause. It is the retroactivity of a law, perhaps moreso than the law’s 
potential to “take” private property, that should be of greatest interest to those 
wishing to challenge a law that burdens property.
When a private party alleges that a law has “taken” that party’s private 
property, it is often the retroactive aspects of the law that causes the psychological 
harm that precipitates the takings litigation. Typically, decisions involving 
property are made pursuant to and consistent with existing law. The law which 
allegedly “takes” the property is a law which changes that existing law, so as to 
either deprive the property owner of a pre-existing right, or impose a new duty. It 
is the fact of a change in the law, applied to existing expectations regarding the 
property, arising under then-existing law, which produces both the economic
harm, and the feeling (on the part of the property owner) that it has been somehow 
unfair to impose the new law retroactivity.
Throughout the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, retroactivity was 
an independent basis for voiding laws which interfered with so-called “vested 
rights.” However, beginning in the 1940s, retroactivity became only one of 
several factors to consider in assessing whether a law affecting private property 
had violated the Takings or Due Process Clauses. Rather than focus on the 
retroactive nature of the law in question, other factors (e.g., the likelihood of the 
law advancing a legitimate state interest) became more important to courts 
considering a law’s constitutionality. The presence or absence of a vested right in 
the property affected was largely irrelevant, in part because property was 
increasingly viewed as being comprised as a "bundle of sticks," where the nature 
of the stick impacted by the law was the critical determination.
The current law of retroactivity has returned to a "vested rights” test. See 
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 1994 WL 144450 (U.S., April 26, 1994) 
[hereinafter Landgraf]. Moreover, the retroactive nature and effect of a law is not 
just a factor to consider as part of a takings analysis. In many cases, the fact of a 
law's retroactivity will cause of the law in question to be a taking. This will occur 
in two situations: First, a law affecting private property will likely be a taking of 
that property when the law manifests "primary" retroactivity altering the past legal 
consequences of past private behavior. Second, a law affecting private property
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may also be a taking if (1) the law constitutes "secondary" retroactivity (altering 
the future legal consequences of past private behavior), and (2) the property 
affected has "protected legal status" (i.e., the Taking Clause protects the property 
from secondary retroactive application of the law).
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II. HISTORY OF RETROACTIVITY
A. Vested-Rights Retroactivity
Retroactivity was an organizing principle in constitutional protection of 
private property prior to the development of substantive due process. The leading 
definition of a retroactive law was offered by Justice Story in Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814): "[A 
retroactive law] takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws,
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or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in 
respect to transactions or considerations already past.” Under this definition, the 
critical retroactive element of a law was not whether the law took effect before its 
applicable date, but whether it operated so as to alter some pre-existing legal 
interest One hundred and eighty years later, in Landgraf (1994), the Supreme 
Court returned to this conception of retroactivity.
Vested rights retroactivity permitted lawmakers to change rules affecting 
property interests without violating the proscription against altering pre-existing 
rights deemed to be vested. Retroactive laws could still reach all interests not 
defined as being vested, thereby avoiding the freezing of existing property rules 
that would have occurred if they had been immune from legislative change. See, 
e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 386 (1798); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 88 
(1834).
B. The Rise of Substantive Due Process and the Decline of
Retroactivity
Between the 1930s and the latter part of the 20th century, interference with 
existing property rights was largely judged according to substantive due process 
standards, and not according to vested rights retroactivity. Under due process 
analysis, a law's retroactive effect was only a factor to consider; it was not 
determinative. Moreover, vested rights were no longer thought to be a useful test
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for whether retroactive laws were valid. This was because commentators and 
courts believed that the term "vested right" was conclusory, and most often used to 
justify the invalidation of a retroactive law that was defective for reasons other 
than the law’s impact on vested rights.
The substantive due process test began to play the same role as vesting 
analysis once did. Under substantive due process, the question was not the effect 
of the retroactive law on a vested right, but the usefulness of retroactivity as a 
means of carrying out the goal of the law. Usery v. Turner Elkhom Mining Co.,
428 U.S. 1 (1976). Retroactivity continued to have independent viability only in 
one specialized context. This was when a property owner had in good faith relied 
upon acts or assurances by government officials, and in doing so had made such a 
substantial change in position that it would be inequitable to take away rights 
acquired as a result of this reliance. In such a case, the government was equitably 
estopped from retroactivity disturbing existing rights.
This government estoppel theory was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court as 
a test to be used in takings analysis. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Court stated that one factor that should be taken into 
account when determining whether a regulation effects a taking was whether it had 
"interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations." A reasonable investment- 
backed expectation had to more than an unilateral expectation or "an abstract need." 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984). There could be no taking
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based on the "expectation" theory advanced in Penn Central if  the private property owner 
affected by the retroactive law had either long been subject to similar laws, or somehow 
been put on notice that a change in the law was inevitable. Concrete Pipe and Products 
of California v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 113 S.Ct. 2264, 2291-2 (1993).
Most private parties affected by retroactive federal legislation focus on the 
degree to which the new law has interfered in the future with past economic 
investments. The Supreme Court, on the other hand, because of its disinclination 
to find takings, instead concentrates its attention on whether a private party’s 
expectations are "reasonable," and the nature of the "expectation" that allegedly 
has been interfered with by the retroactive law. An expectation that an existing 
federal law will not change is not reasonable when the party affected by the 
change has notice of the likelihood of some future change. United States v. Locke,
471 U.S. 84, 106 (1985). This notice can be constructive, and be implied if  those 
subject to the new law operate in a heavily regulated field. FHA v. The Darlinton,
Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). An expectation is not reasonable if  the party 
asserting its interference has, prior to the changed law, voluntarily assumed the 
risk of some subsequent change. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1531 
(1992). An expectation also may not be reasonable if it is held by someone other 
than the party alleging the taking. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715 (1987).
Nor does a private party have an expectation that immunizes it from 
subsequent federal legislation if that party's prior legal relationship with a federal
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entity belies any reliance on the absence of future legislative amendments. Two 
aspects of the prior legal relationship produce a presumption that the expectation 
should be one of change, and not one of no change. First, if the party alleging a 
taking has "long been subject to federal regulation, [then] [t]hose who do business 
in the regulated field cannot object if  the legislative scheme is buttressed by 
subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end.” Locke, supra at 106 n. 15. 
Second, if  the complaining party has a contract with the federal government, 
whose consequences are then altered by subsequent legislation, there is no taking 
if  the terms of the contract have provided notice that future change is possible.
Even if a private party has a reasonable expectation of no change, there is still not 
a taking if that party’s investment-backed expectations "can continue to be realized
as long as he complies with, reasonable regulatory restrictions. . . ” Cisneros v.
Alpine Ridge Group, 113 S.Ct. 1898, 1902-03 (1993).
Perhaps the only expectation that will be consistently protected by the Court is one 
that is explicitly guaranteed by the federal government. When, for example, a federal 
statute gives a company explicit assurances that a federal agency is prohibited from 
disclosing publicly any data submitted to the agency by the company, the company's 
security in the confidentiality of the data has protected legal status, immunizing it 
(through the Takings Clause) from legislative amendments retroactivity authorizing 
disclosure of the date. Ruckelshaus, supra at 1011.
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By the 1990s, retroactivity was increasingly viewed as a component of both 
substantive due process and takings analyses. It was not usually an independent 
grounds for invalidating laws. See Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray 
& Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 475 
U.S. 211 (1986). Vested rights retroactivity had been largely abandoned by the 
courts. To the extent retroactivity survived at all as an argument against laws 
which interfered with property, it was usually in the context of takings claims.
And as a factor to consider in takings cases, it was relatively insignificant.
III. MODERN RETROACTIVITY
A. Manifestations of Retroactivity
There are three general ways by which a law can be retroactively applied: 
Legislative Enactments - When there is a statute, there is a presumption that 
it is to be prospective only. This presumption can be overcome only if  there is 
clear legislative intent that the statute is to be retroactive. Landgraf; Mojica v. 
Gannett Co., 7 F.3d 552 (7th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. TRW, Inc., 4 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 
1993); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795 ( 8th Cir. 1993).
Administrative Rules - The Supreme Court has noted that administrative 
rules must be statements that have legal consequences only for the future. Bowen 
v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988). They are permitted if
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the power to promulgate them is conveyed by Congress in express terms. Cal- 
Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dept of Agriculture, 14 F.3d 429,442 (9th Cir. 1993).
Court Decisions - In 1993, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 
113 S.Ct. 2510 (1993), the Supreme Court held that when a court applies a new 
rule of federal law to the parties before it, the new rule must be given full 
retroactive effect (1) in all cases still open on direct review, and (2) to all events 
predating the new rule. When a court explicitly leaves open all questions 
regarding the retroactive application of its decision, and does not apply the new 
rule to the parties before it, a case-by-case balancing of several factors determines 
whether the new decision is to have retroactive effort. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 
404 U.S. 97 (1971). Ferguson v. Roberts, 11 F.3d 696, 700-01 (7th Cir. 1993).
B. Landgraf and the Return of Vested Rights Retroactivity
On April 26, 1994, the Landgraf Court signalled a return to vested rights 
retroactivity, as well as the possible emergence of retroactivity as a separate 
ground for attacking laws that affect private property rights. The majority opinion 
creates a presumption of prospectivity for all non-judicial law changes, rebuttable 
only by evidence of legislative intent to the contrary. Landgraf reminds us that 
antiretroactivity presumptions are founded in fairness — in the idea that the 
persons should conform their conduct according to what the law is. To do 
otherwise is to allow law makers "to sweep away settled expectations suddenly,"
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and to shake "people['s] confidence about the legal consequences of their actions." 
Prospective application of new laws, on the other hand, is consistent with (1) the 
need for "notice,” (2) the equities of "reliance,” (3) the benefits of "predictability" 
and "stability" when laws seek to reach contractual and property rights, and (4) the 
value associated with certainty in “planning.”
The Court's constitutional concern with retroactivity revolves around a 
retroactive law's effect on “vested rights.” Not only does the Landgraf opinion 
adopt Justice Story's definition of impermissible retroactive legislation (“statutes 
which, though operating from their passage, affect ‘vested rights’”), it also 
redefines the Takings Clause as preventing government actions from “depriving 
private persons of vested property rights except for a ‘public use’ and upon 
payment of ‘just compensation.’” The court's adoption of a vested rights test is 
criticized in Justice Scalia's concurring opinion as being both inadequate as an 
approach to retroactivity and inconsistent with other Court cases involving 
retroactivity. The majority is nonetheless firm that the Court's new retroactivity 
rule prohibits "giv[ing] to statutes a retrospective operation, whereby rights 
previously vested are injuriously affected."
The Court also seems to create three classes of retroactive laws. Depending 
upon what class it falls within, the law will be more or less likely to be voided for 
being impermissibly retroactive.
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C. Primary Retroactivity, Secondary Retroactivity with Non-Protected
Legal Status, and Secondary Retroactivity with Protected Legal Status
There is some consensus on what retroactivity is, and what it is not. Three 
examples of legal actions can be called retroactive, although only one of the three 
is certain to be void as a matter of law for being impermissible retroactive.
Example #1 is a law which alters the past legal consequences of past private 
actions. This is as "primary" retroactivity. Assume that a developer purchases a 
parcel of land in 1970 which is zoned with a one-half acre minimum lot size. 
Pursuant to this zoning classification, the developer builds twelve homes on one- 
half acre lots on the six acres. In 1995 the zoning authority changes the minimum 
lot size to two acres, and makes the new zoning restriction retroactive to 1970.
The effect of the new zoning law is that in 1970 the developer had permission to 
build only three houses on the six acres. The 1995 zoning change has altered the 
past legal consequences (building a home on one-half acre lots is permissible prior 
to 1995) of past private actions (the developer built home on one-half acre lots 
prior to 1995). Such primary retroactivity is almost surely void. The Landgraf 
decision terms these laws as “explicitly retroactive legislation, i.e., statutes . . .  
enacted to take effect from a time anterior to their passage.” See also Ralis v. 
RFE/RL, Inc., 770 F.2d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Example #2 is a law which alters the future legal consequences of past 
private actions. Laws which have exclusively future effect, but which affect the
l 1
legal future consequences of past private behavior, and thereby expectations 
arising from past action, are characterized as "secondary" retroactivity. This is by 
far the most frequently occurring form of retroactivity. Assume that the developer 
in the above paragraph purchased six acres in 1970, when the land use planning 
laws permitted houses to be built on one-half acre lots, but did not do anything 
with the land for 25 years. Assume also that in 1995 the zoning was changed to 
permit only a two-acre minimum lot size, but that this change, unlike the change in 
Example #1, is to be effective only after 1995. Although seemingly prospective in 
application, the new law has a retroactive effect on the past actions of the 
developer. The developer may have purchased the land in 1970 with the 
expectation that it would continue to be zoned for one-half acre lots, permitting 
eventual construction of up to twelve homes. The 1995 change permits only three 
homes, thus having an economic effect on the decision to buy in 1970, where that 
decision may have been made on the assumption that the lot size requirements 
would not be altered, and that twelve homes could someday be built. Despite the 
fact that the economic consequences could be severe for facts originating 
antecedent to the new law, this kind of secondary retroactivity is usually thought 
to be acceptable..
Secondary retroactivity affecting private actions that have no protected legal 
status is sometimes not termed retroactivity at all. The Landgraf decision refers to 
this kind of secondary retroactivity when it says “[a] statute does not operate
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‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct 
antedating the statute’s enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law.” See 
also Fleming v. Rhodes 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947) (“federal regulation of future 
action based upon rights previously acquired by the person regulated is not 
prohibited by the Constitution”); Dyce v. Salaried Employees’ Pension Plan, 15 
F.3d 163, 166 (11th Cir. 1994); Pinnock v. International House House of 
Pancakes, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Example #3 is a law which alters the future legal consequences of past 
private action, but unlike Example #2, those past private actions may have 
protected legal status with respect to the new law. This third kind of retroactivity 
may be characterized as “legal status" retroactivity, because the new law is 
affecting neither the past legal consequences of past private actions (primary 
retroactivity), nor just the future legal consequences of past private actions 
(secondary retroactivity). The new law is also affecting the future consequences 
of past private actions which may have some legal status regarding the new law. If 
the past action has provided the party with “protected” legal status, a law affecting 
only the future legal effect of the past action may be void for interfering in the 
future with a previously protected legal status. If the past action has resulted in 
legal status, but not protected status, the normal presumptions of the validity of 
secondary retroactivity will apply, and the new law will survive.
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In the case of the developer who purchased the six acres in 1970, assume 
that in 1980 the land was platted by the county under then current law to provide 
for twelve homes on the six acres, consistent with the then-applicable one-half 
acre minimum lot size requirement. Assume that no homes are built before 1995, 
but in 1995 the county changes the minimum lot size to two acres, and then 
abolishes all platting for which construction has not begun, effective in 1995. The 
1980 platting has been abolished, the new two-acre minimum lot size requirement 
does not permit the twelve homes to be built on the 12 platted lots, and the legal 
status (the 1980 platting) of past private actions (the 1970 purchase of the land) 
has been altered in the future by the 1995 law. The difficult, and often-litigated 
question is whether the past legal status (the platting) is “protected,” thereby 
preventing its future alteration. The ability of the law to operate on past actions 
usually depends on the precise nature and character of the legal status of these past 
actions under the past law. See, e.g. L.M. Everhart Construction v. Jefferson 
County Planning Com’n, 2 F.3d 48 (4th Cir. 1993) (approval of a subdivision plat 
does not create a vested right); Friends of the Law v. King County, 869 P.2d 1056 
(Wash. 1994) (approval of preliminary plat did create a vested right).
The Landgraf opinion seems to assume that private actions have protected 
legal status with respect to retroactive laws in one of two situations. First, 
protected legal status attaches when the law “takes away or impairs vested rights 
acquired under existing laws.” This occurs when there is a vested right, and the
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right is impaired by retroactive application of the new law. See, e.g., United States 
v. Stella Perez, 839 F.Supp. 92 (D.P.R. 1993); Saint Vincent Hospital and Health 
Center v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, 862 P.2d 6 (Mont. 1993). The 
Court seems to define a vested right as a right associated with an event that is 
“completed” before operation of the new begins (“transactions already 
completed”). See also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423,430 (1987) (“a law is 
retrospective if  it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its 
effective date.”).
Several, there is protected legal status when a law retroactivity “creates a 
new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability or liability for 
transactions already past.” See e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 863 P.2d 513 (Or. App. 
1993); OSI Industries v. Utah State Tax Com’n, 860 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1993)
IV. TAKINGS AND RETROACTIVITY
Case law tends to simplify the three definitions of retroactivity by relying 
on a dichotomy: A law is considered to operate prospectively (and permissibly) 
when it implicates conduct occurring on or after the law's effective law. 
Conversely, a law is considered retroactive (and preemptively impermissible) 
when it alters the legal consequences of conduct occurring before the law’s 
effective date. O f course, often it is difficult to characterize a law as either 
retroactive or prospective, because even if  the law is made applicable to
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transactions or conduct occurring after the law’s effective date, such a law may 
indirectly, and significantly, affect the outcome of transactions and conduct 
occurring before its effective date. Most courts deal with this reality by relying on
A
the following rule: A law does not operate retroactively simply because its 
application requires some reference to antecedent facts.
The case law dichotomy between prospective and retroactive laws is 
roughly the difference between “secondary” and “primary” retroactivity. In the 
former case (secondary retroactivity, or prospectivity), the future legal effect of a 
present action is changed, even if the present action originated in the past, and will 
become less desirable in the future. In the latter case (primary retroactivity, or 
retroactivity), an act lawful when completed in the past becomes unlawful by 
operation of new law.
Case law also recognizes a third kind of factual situation which may 
precipate retroactivity concerns. This is when past actions or transactions have 
resulted in the creation of past legal rights, duties, or limitations with respect to 
such actions/transactions. In such a case, a law is deemed to be impermissibly 
retroactive if it “takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, 
or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in 
respect to transactions or considerations already past.” This third rule of 
retroactivity, adopted by the Landgraf Court, is similar to “legal status 
retroactivity,” because the legal difficulty with the law is not because it operates in
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the future on past private behavior (secondary retroactivity), but because it affects 
the future legal effect of past actions that in the past may have had some kind of 
protected legal status. The Takings Clause provides the most protected legal status 
to private actions affected by secondary retroactivity. See United States v.
Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
Perhaps the easiest way to understand retroactivity is to visualize a time­
line which begins with the "old law," and ends with the future legal effects of a 
“new law” on facts arising either under the "old" or "new" law. The general 
chronological sequence of retroactivity starts with the old, pre-existing law. 
Pursuant to this law, or in reliance on this law, or with this law as a backdrop, 
private actions take place. These private actions can take one of three forms.
First, they may be plans or preliminary decisions that are neither completed nor 
given any legal status before the new law is adopted. Using the example of the 
developer of the six acres, this kind of private action would be the developer’s 
decision to defer other land purchases so that sufficient funds are available 
eventually to purchase the six acres. Second, they may be private marketplace 
transactions that are completed or consummated before the law, but which have no 
particular protected legal status vis-a-vis the new law. An example would be the 
developer’s purchase of the land when the law permitted one-half acre building 
sites. The land purchase has legal status, and was likely made because the
17
developer had an expectation that twelve homes could be built there. But the land 
purchase, alone, probably cannot prevent future application of a two-acre 
minimum size requirement. Third, they may be private actions that are both 
completed and given protected legal status before adoption of the new law. If the 
developer not only purchased the six acres, but also successfully had the land 
platted by the appropriate planning authorities for 12 lots before adoption of the 
two acre per lot limitation, the developer would have completed a transaction (the 
purchase) with possibly protected legal status (the platting) prior to the new law.
When a new law is adopted that addresses the same subject as the old law, 
and when private actions have taken place under the old law, several outcomes are 
possible. The easiest case (Case I) to predict is when the new law is not meant to 
be retroactivity applied to past private actions, even in the future. This can occur 
explicitly, when the maker of the new law includes in it a grandfather clause or a 
“subject to valid existing rights” provision. It may also occur implicitly, when the 
new is interpreted to apply only prospectively.
A more difficult case (Case II) occurs when the past private action has 
resulted in the creation of a legally enforceable substantive right or duty prior to 
adoption of the new law, and when the new law affects that right or duty. The 
new law can affect the right or duty by (1) voiding it or making it unenforceable, 
(2) abolishing it and replacing it with a new right or duty, or (3) modifying or 
impairing it. If the new law does any of the above, and if it is operative for a time
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prior to the effective date of the new law, the new law has primary retroactivity 
and is usually void.
If the new law affects pre-existing rights or duties only in the future, it has 
secondary retroactivity. If the past rights and duties have protected legal status 
with respect to the new law with future effect (typically because they are afforded 
protection by some constitutional principle, such as the Takings Clause), the new 
law has protected legal status retroactivity, and will likely be void. See, e.g., Skip 
Kirchdorfer, Inc. v. U.S., 6 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Blumberg v. Pinellas 
County, 836 F. Supp. 839 (M.D.Fla. 1993). If the past rights and duties have not 
protected legal status, the new law has simple secondary retroactivity. Such 
secondary retroactivity is often viewed by courts as equivalent to prosectivity. 
Laws with exclusively future effect which change the consequences of past private 
actions which have no protected legal status (particularly under the Takings 
Clause) are usually able to resist a retroactivity challenge. See, e.g., Costanino v. 
TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969 (6th Cir. 1994).
The most difficult case (Case III) is when there is some past private action 
which has not yet matured into a substantive legal right or duty, but which was 
initially undertaken in reliance on the old law. A new law may impose unexpected 
future legal effects on such past events. When this past private action has no past 
legal effect (e.g., a developer who defers economic decisions in anticipation of 
taking future action consistent with the old law), the new law may affect the
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future consequences of this past action, and thereby thwart expectations that may 
have arisen from the action. This is permissible secondary retroactivity. But when 
this past action has some past legal consequence (e.g., when the developer 
purchases land in reliance on the old law, or when the developer purchases land 
and receives platting from the county), then future applications of the new law to 
the antecedent facts (secondary retroactivity) may not only defeat private 
expectations, but also interfere with the legal status of the past action. Such “legal 
status” retroactivity is similar to secondary retroactivity because it affects the 
future legal consequences of past actions. Although secondary retroactivity is 
normally acceptable (and often classified as prospectivity), the “legal status” form 
of secondary retroactivity will be impermissible if the new law interferes with past 
private action which has “protected” legal status with respect to the new law.
Protected legal status may occur when the past actions may not have 
ripened into a legally protected right or duty, such as a property or contract right, 
but which may nonetheless have sufficient legal consequence in relationship to the 
new law to resist its application. In the case of the developer who contemplates 
the purchase of six acres of land for the building of 12 homes, the mere purchase 
of the land has legal status, but probably not sufficient legal status to protect the 
developer from imposition of a subsequent two-acre minimum lot size 
requirement. However, the purchase of land, coupled with county approval of a 
plat for the land with 12 building sites, may have enough protected legal status to
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prevent the new two-acre lot size rule from applying to the platted land. This is 
because a legally approved plat with 12 building sites on six acres may be 
considered a vested property right, which would be interfered with by a rule 
imposing a two-acre minimum lot size on the six acres.
There are, then, two kinds of legal status for purposes of retroactivity. 
Non-protected legal status describes a private action that has a legal effect, but not 
in relation to the new law. Protected legal status is when a private action not only 
has a legal effect, but also a legal effect capable of defeating secondary retroactive 
application of the new law. A private action characterized as having protected 
legal status may be immunized from secondary retroactivity if that action is seen 
as a constitutionally protected "substantive" right or duty, such as a contract right, 
In re Workers Compensation Refund, 842 F. Supp. 1211 (D. Minn. 1994), or a 
property right protected by the Takings Clause. Shelden v. U.S., 7 F.3d 1022 
(Fed. Cir. 1993). If a private party cannot prove the existence of such a 
substantive legal right or duty having protected legal status, the party may still 
prevent secondary retroactive application of the new law if the party can 
successfully allege that the action otherwise subject to the new law has one of two 
kinds of protected legal status.
First, a private action is likely to have protected legal status if it is deemed 
to be a "vested right.” The term is conclusory, and "there are no bright line tests to 
determine what constitutes a vested right or when that right accrues." Some courts
21
assume that a vested right must be a complete and consummated right to present 
and future use or enjoyment, which is not a mere expectation based on a 
continuance of existing law, and where the interest does not depend upon an 
uncertain event or period. In determining whether a new law impairs vested rights 
in the future, other courts do not focus on whether there is a "right” that is 
"vested," but whether the law defeats bonafide reasonable intentions, or surprises 
persons who have long relied on a contrary state of law. See, e.g., Mamcopa 
County v. Arizona, 866 P.2d 158 (Ariz. 1993).
Second, some courts are willing to confer on past actions protected legal 
status when the new rule makes worthless substantial past investment incurred in 
reliance upon a prior rule which either encouraged or in some way authorized the 
past actions. In this second case, the question of protected legal status retroactivity 
is not judged according to whether there is a vested right, but on whether the 
secondary retroactivity is reasonable, or equitable. See, e.g., Hy Kom 
Development Co. v. Manatee Cty, 837 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D.Fla. 1993).
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CASE I
OLD LAW NEW LAW
Private Action  expectations but no right/duty
Private Action right/duty
Inapplicable to all past private action










deny, void or make unenforceable or illegal 
right/duty
Secondary Retroactivity Permissible
CASE I Private Action r ig h t /d uty right/duty abolished and replaced with new right/duty
Primary Retroactivity Impermissible
Private Action right/duty right/duty abolished and replaced with new 
right/duty
Secondary Retroactivity Permissible
Private Action right/duty right/duty impaired or modified Primary Retroactivity Impermissible
Private Action right/duty right/duty impaired or modified Secondary Retroactivity Permissible
Private Action right/duty with protected  
l egal status under 
right/duty impaired, modified, or abolished
constitutional law
| expectations, plans and transactions without legal effect 
j completed transactions with legal effect
expectations altered or defeated
























DEFINITION APPLICATION O F  NEW LAW
investments made worthlesscompleted transactions and investments made in reasonable 
reliance on old law
Private Action




Nature of “New” 1995 Law 1960 Law [Old County Law] 
(zoned 1/2 acre lot size)
1990 Law [Private Conduct] 1995 Law [New County Law] 
(rezoned 2 acre lot size)
Prosp ectivitv
• 6 acres purchased by developer
• 12 homes built by developer on 
12 sites of 1/2 acre
Only 3 homes permitted on the 6 
acres purchases.
Effective only for private 
transactions completed after 1995. 
Effective in 1995, subject to vaid 
existing rights.
Prim ary R etroactively
(Past legal consequences of past 
private actions)
• 6 acres purchased
• 12 homes built on 12 sites of 
1/2 acre
Effective in 1960
Secondary R etroactively  
(Future legal consequences of past 
private actions which have ripened 
into a right/duty, which do not have 
protected legal status)
• 6 acres purchased (expectation 
that 12 homes possible)
Effective in 1995
Secondary R etroactively
(Future legal consequences of past 
private actions which have ripened 
into a right/duty, which do have 
protected legal status)
• 6 acres purchased
• Contract with county to supply 
water, sewage, and roads for 
12 homes
• Sales Ks with 12 home buyers
Effective in 1995
Secondary R etroactively w ith  
N on-Protected Legal Status
(Expectations and plans without legal 
effect)
Plans, preliminary decisions, 
money set aside to purchase 6 
acres Effective in 1995
Secondary R etroactively w ith  
Protected Legal Status
(Completed transactions creating 
vested rights)
• 6 acres purchased
• County platting for 12 sites and 
county issuance of 12 building 
permits
Effective in 1995
Secondary R etroactively w ith  
Protected L egal Status
(Completed transactions made in 
reliance on old law)
• County assurances that 12 
homes would be acceptable on 
6 acres
• 6 acres purchased
Effective in 1995
